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McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Company: Progression of the After-Acquired
Evidence Doctrine
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner PublishingCo.,1 the United States
Supreme Court held that after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing that would have led to termination on lawful and legitimate grounds
does not bar the employee from all relief sought under an employment
discrimination action.2 The plaintiff, Christine McKennon, had worked
for the defendant, Nashville Banner Publishing Company, for thirty
years when, as claimed by Banner, she was discharged as part of a work
force reduction plan.3 McKennon, who was sixty-two years old at the
time of her discharge, claimed that her termination was based on her
age." She filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee, alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA) and seeking the legal and equitable
remedies available under the statute-back pay and liquidated
damages.6 During discovery, Banner took McKennon's deposition and
learned she had copied confidential documents concerning the company's
financial condition.7 McKennon maintained she copied the documents
for her own protection.' Banner sent McKennon a letter saying that her
actions were in violation of her job responsibilities and again notified her
that she was terminated." The letter indicated that if Banner had
known of McKennon's misconduct at the time of her termination, it
would have discharged her at once for that reason.10 Both parties
agreed that had Nashville Banner known of McKennon's misconduct

1.

115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).

2. Id. at 881.
3. Id. at 882.
4. Id. at 883.

5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
6. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).

7.
8.
9.
10.

115 S. Ct. at 883.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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before discharge, the company would have had lawful grounds for
discharge based on the neutral application of Banner's employment
policies. 1 In order to reach summary judgment, Banner conceded
discrimination against McKennon.' 2 The district court held that
McKennon's misconduct constituted grounds for termination and that,
based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine, she was not entitled to
any remedies under the ADEA."3 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same rationale. 14 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicting views
among the circuit courts of appeals and held that an employee discharged in violation of the ADEA is not barred from all relief when, after
her discharge, the employer discovers evidence of wrongdoing, that in
any event, would have led to the employee's termination on lawful and
legitimate grounds." In addition, the Court determined that back pay,
but not reinstatement
or front pay, is appropriate inder the ADEA if all
6
relief is not barred.

When dealing with employment discrimination cases, there is a
continuum to which a court must refer concerning the severity of an
employer's discrimination versus the degree of an employee's wrongdoing.' 7 Employment discrimination cases may be separated into three
categories: inferential disparate treatment cases, mixed motive cases,
and after-acquired evidence cases." An example of an inferential
disparate treatment case is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.'9 In
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff established prima facie requirements
for disparate treatment.20 Defendant McDonnell Douglas maintained
that the company refused to rehire the employee based on his illegal
action concerning civil rights demonstrations directed at McDonnell

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. After-acquired evidence is information that is discovered after an unlawful
termination or disciplinary action that would have constituted grounds for lawful
termination had it been known at the time of termination. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.at 886.
17. See generally HAL LEWIS, LITIGATING CIvIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION CASES §§ 6.10-6.12, 305-29 (1996).

18. Id.

19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
20. Id.at 802. The four elements from McDonnell Douglas are evidence that the
employee: "(1) belongs to protected group; (2) applied or continued to desire the position in
question; (3) met minimum uniform qualifications to receive or retain the position; and (4)
was rejected." LEWIS, supra note 17, § 6.10, at 306.
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Douglas.2 1 The Court concluded when the prima facie requirements of
disparate treatment exist, an employer may not use employee conduct
as a pretext for refusing to rehire.2 2 A legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason must be shown with evidence that clearly explains its proffered
reason.' The prima facie elements will be applied to each case in a
flexible manner.' Prima facie evidence establishes disparate treatment unless the defendant employer can show a legitimate reason for
termination.2 5 This legitimate reason for termination, or even disciplinary action, forms a natural transition by courts to the application of the
"mixed motive" doctrine. The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of
mixed motive in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 6 In order for a case to
meet the mixed motive doctrine, an employer must show (1) there was
both a legitimate reason for termination as well as an illegal reason at
the time of termination, and (2) that7 the legitimate reason would have
resulted in termination without any reliance on the unlawful reason.27
This approach has been termed the "same decision" rationale.28
Remedies available under the mixed motive doctrine vary depending on
the discrimination statute involved.29 Title VII ° allows for compensatory and punitive damages while the ADEA allows for back pay and
injunctive relief.8 ' After-acquired evidence varies from mixed motive
in that when dealing with after-acquired evidence, at the time of
termination, no lawful or legitimate reason for termination was known
to the employer. 2 It is important to distinguish an after-acquired
evidence situation from a mixed motive situation.3 For a case to fall
under the after-acquired evidence doctrine, an employer must be able to
establish that if it had known of the employee's misconduct prior to
unlawful termination, such knowledge would have resulted in immediate
termination.' Prior to the decision in McKennon, there was disparity

21. 411 U.S. at 796.
22. Id. at 804.
23. LEWIS, supra note 17, § 6.10, at 310.
24. Id. at 302.
25. Id. at 303; McDonnel Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
26. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
27. LEwIs, supra note 17, § 6.11, at 316 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989)).
28. Id. at 317. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
29. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (1994); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e17.
31. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (1994) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
32. LEwIs, supra note 17, § 6.12, at 322.

33. Id.
34. 115 S. Ct. at 886-87. What policies a company would base this decision upon are
not clear at this time. The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether an employer
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among the circuits concerning the effects of after-acquired evidence. In
6
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University,"
the Sixth
Circuit determined that an employee suffered no legal damage from
EEOC sexual discrimination because of after-acquired evidence that the
employee had falsified her employment application. 6 In like fashion,
the Seventh Circuit in Washington v. Lake County,87 initially called
what was in fact an after-acquired evidence case, a mixed motive case,
and applied a similar rationale as the Sixth Circuit in Milligan,barring
the employee's relief." However, more recently, the Seventh Circuit in
Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 9 and the Eleventh Circuit in
Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 4 both found, to varying degrees,
that after-acquired evidence does not bar, all relief.4 The Seventh
Circuit, in Washington, originally found that such evidence barred relief,
but later found in Kristufek that such evidence only limits relief.4 2
Whereas, the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace "expressly rejected" that the
doctrine of after-acquired evidence bars all relief.4 In that case, the
court found the after-acquired evidence irrelevant at the liability stage,
but relevant in adjusting remedies equitably when considering the
statutory purpose of discrimination statutes." The Supreme Court's
finding in McKennon constitutes a necessary first step toward continuity
in the application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in employment
discrimination cases.
The Supreme Court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner PublishingCo.
began its analysis by first distinguishing the case from the Court's
decision in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Dolye4 .' Mt. Healthy
was a mixed motive case where both a lawful and unlawful reason
motivated the employee's dismissal."' The Court found that Mt.
Healthy could not control McKennon since at the time of McKennon's
termination, Banner only had knowledge of an unlawful reason.' Even

would have to use previously established policies that have already been neutrally applied.
35. 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
36. Id. at 305.
37. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
38. Id. at 255, 257.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 371; Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1184.
985 F.2d at 371. Washington, 969 F.2d at 256-57.
968 F.2d at 1184.
LEWIS, supra note 17, § 6.12, at 324.
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.,
Id.
Id.
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though only an unlawful reason for termination existed at the time of
termination, the Court did not find McKennon was a case of inferential
disparate treatment, but instead a case of after-acquired evidence since
later a lawful reason to terminate was discovered.49 The Court
determined that in order for the after-acquired evidence doctrine to be
applicable, the employer must establish that the wrongdoing is of such
severity that the employee would have been terminated on those grounds
alone if the employer had knowledge of such wrongdoing at the time of
termination. 0 The Court in McKennon held that the application of the
after-acquired evidence rule will not preclude employees from all relief
granted under the ADEA. 5" According to the Court, the employee's
wrongdoing must be taken into account in determining which remedies
are appropriate considering the "lawful prerogative of the employer in
the usual course of its business." 2 The Court found that generally, in
an after-acquired evidence situation, neither reinstatement nor front pay
is an appropriate remedy." Back pay is more difficult to measure and
cannot be completely barred. 4 A court should take equitable circumstances into account in determining the appropriate remedies."' The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had relied on Summers v. State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co." and Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems57 in barring relief to McKennon on the basis of afteracquired evidence."8 In distinguishing McKennon from Summers and
Honeywell, the Supreme Court refused to allow after-acquired evidence
to carry the same weight as either lawful termination or mixed motive
termination." Allowing after-acquired evidence to carry the same
weight would not further the purposes of employment discrimination
Discrimination statutes generally have two primary
statutes.'
objectives-(1) deterrence and (2) compensation."' "[I1f after-acquired
evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination

49. Id.
50. Id. at 886-87.
51. Id. at 883. This is a similar course to the Eleventh Circuit, but not identical.
LEWIS, supra note 17, § 6.12, at 320.

52.
53.
54.
55.
66.
57.
58.

115 S. Ct. at 886.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 885-86.
864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
115 S. Ct. at 885.

59. Id.

60. Id. at 884.
61. Id.
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operates, in every instance to bar all relief for an earlier violation[,]" the
two objectives of discrimination statutes would be lost. 2 The fact that
discrimination did take place cannot be ignored because the intent
behind the ADEA is to protect employees from discrimination in the
workplace.' As a result, both deterrence and compensation are goals
of the statute." Under the ADEA, means of relief normally include
reinstatement, back. pay, injunctive relief, declaratory judgement, and
attorney fees."5 The Court refused to bar McKennon from all relief in
light of the after-acquired nature of the lawful reason for termination
and remanded the case for further determination of the appropriate
remedies."
While the Supreme Court's decision in McKennon takes the requisite
first step toward clarifying the application of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine, it does not provide all the answers necessary to establish
uniformity for all types of employment discrimination cases. The Court's
decision in McKennon resolves the disparity among federal circuits with
regard to the ADEA and after-acquired evidence." The Court's finding
is a natural progression from the mixed motive doctrine's emphasis on
employer's actions." With the after-acquired evidence doctrine, the
burden is on the employer to establish that the wrongdoing of the
employee would have been severe enough to bring about lawful
termination and thereby lessen the remedies that are available to
wrongfully terminated employees.6 9 However, even with an apparently
straight forward holding, the Court left several issues unresolved. First,
the Court failed to address the application of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine to other types of employment discrimination. 0 Also, it is
unclear how severe an employee's misconduct must be to warrant the
application of the after-acquired evidence rule instead of the discrimina71
tion being determined to be merely inferential disparate treatment.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 886.
64. Id. at 884.

65. Id. See 29 U.S.C. I 626(b) (1994).
66. 115 S. Ct. at 887.
67. Id.at 883.
68. It is key to distinguish an after-acquired evidence situation from a mixed motive

situation.
69. LEwIS, supra note 17, § 6.12, at 326.
70. McKennon was seeking to recover only under the ADEA. 115 S. Ct. at 883.

71. See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 1086, abrogated by 115 S. Ct. 879. "It appears from this standard that it is
unnecessary for the court to agree that the employee's misconduct is 'serious' or 'pervasive'
as long as the employer can prove that under its established rules, applied without
discrimination, it would have discharge the employee had it known of such conduct when
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Next, the Court did not address the standard for judging the equity of
an employer's lawful termination policies and whether those policies
have been neutrally applied.72 In addition, the Court alluded to, but
failed to describe, special circumstances affecting the legitimate interests
of the involved parties that would cut off back pay with termination."
The Court merely gave a "beginning point" for others to use in the
determination of calculation of back pay.74 As is generally appropriate
under the ADEA, the Court did not consider the issue of liquidated
damages and left the issue to the lower court on remand for consideration concerning remedies.7" Finally, because the decision in McKennon involved only the application of the ADEA and no other employment
discrimination statutes, it is unclear what remedies will apply to other
employment discrimination statues, such as Title VII.7 6 In conjunction
with the issue of remedies available under other employment discrimination statutes like Title VII, allowance of compensatory and punitive
damages in the face of after-acquired evidence is unclear.77 It may be
assumed that the application of liquidated damages to an ADEA
situation and compensatory and punitive damages in a Title VII
situation would be allowed by future decisions concerning after-acquired
evidence because of the objectives of employment discrimination
statutes.78 If these remedies are not allowed, the general objectives of
employment discrimination-deterrence and compensation-would be
abandoned.'

LAUREN L. LOGAN

it occurred." LEWIS, supra note 17, § 6.12, at 326.
72. Will the standard of the employer be used? What if the employer does not have an
established standard or has an established standard that has not yet been applied?
73. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
74. LEWIS, supra note 17, § 6.12, at 327.
75. LEWIS, supra note 17, § 6.12, at 328. Back pay is doubled under the ADEA for
liquidated damages. Id.
76. Id. at 324.
77. Id. at 323-24. Compensatory and punitive damages are allowed under Title VII,

§ 703(m).
78.

LEWIS, supra note 17, at § 6.12, at 324.

79. Id.

